**Performance Analysis of Agricultural Sector Policy**

**in North Central Timor Regency**

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**Abstract.** This study aims to describe the performance of agricultural sector policy in North Central Timor regency with focus on the implementation of the Desa Mandiri Cinta Petani (Sari Tani) program and done with qualitative descriptive is case study approach to build alternative models of acceleration in agricultural sector policy. Performance measures include inputs, processes, outputs, outcomes, and impacts. This research also uses Grindle concept to explain the implementation of Sari Tani program which viewed from two aspects, namely content of policy and context implementation with political perspective, because basically agricultural sector policy is also inseparable from the influence of political interests of the actors involved in the implementation of the program. The result of the research shows that the superior program performance is not optimal because of the high tendency of intervention of political interests of the actors involved in stages and systematic enough that ultimately impact on the low rate of return of revolving fund of farmer group which only reach 38%. To improve the acceleration of agricultural sector development, it is necessary to form a special team that is independent.

Keywords: sari tani program, performance, north central timor regency

Introduction

Development of the agricultural sector has a very strategic role, because not only play a role in improving the economy of rural communities, but also aspects of empowerment to realize socio-economic independence of rural communities. The Desa Mandiri Cinta Petani (Sari Tani) program initiated by the Regent of North Central Timor since 2011 to create creative economy and food sovereignty in the village community is a bottom up policy by placing society as the subject of development. This research is about to analyze the performance of North Central Timor Regent's superior program by using Grindle (1980) concept to explain the process of program implementation involving many actors with various variations of their interests. Thus, this study not only examines the procedural technical aspects, but also the socio-political aspects. Consideration, both aspects become the determining factor of successful implementation of agricultural sector development policy in North Central Timor regency.

The underlying background of the initiative of the Sari Tani program by North Central Timor Regent Raymundus Sau Fernandes and his deputy Aloysius Kobes in the period 2010-2015 and resumed in the second period of 2015-2020, since similar programs based on empowerment the villagers are less than optimal, so they have not been able to overcome poverty. These programs include Inpres Desa Tertinggal (IDT) and Program Pengembangan Terpadu Antar Desa (PPTAD) (Zulfida, et al., 2015: 307-318). In addition, the Beras Miskin (Raskin) program and Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) program tend to spoil the community. These instant programs have an impact on the increasing level of community dependence on the state and the absence of new jobs. This has damaged the mental and local wisdom values ​​of the village community, such as the reduced work ethic of village communities, resulting in a high level of poverty in the North Central Timor regency. The poverty is due to the lack of access to venture capital and minimal job creation.

Based on data from Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS, 2012) recorded poor families in North Central Timor regency reached 65.62%. The status of North Central Timor regency as a poor area is further strengthened by Presidential Regulation Number 131 of 2015 on Determination of Emerging Areas in 2015-2019, in which North Central Timor regency is included in the category of disadvantaged regions. Chronic poverty in the North Central Timor regency has made poverty one of the strategic issues that require appropriate, systematic and systematic handling, so that this poverty issue is set forth in the North Timor Mid-term Development Plans of North Central Timor regency 2010-2015 and 2015-2020.

To that end, Sari Tani program becomes an alternative offered by the regent, in order to overcome poverty, especially in rural communities. This program aims to increase the independence and income of the community through the development of superior products in accordance with the available resources in the North Central Timor regency. In addition, the region's flagship program is the realization of the regent's promise when campaigning in local elections and, politically, has received support from the Regional Representative Council so there is certainty of budget support because it has been included in the regional budget. In accordance with the characteristics of the problems faced in poverty alleviation, this program offers a convenience for people who need business capital, especially the agricultural sector. Ideally, this will have an impact on the creation of employment in the agricultural sector and the opportunity of the village community, especially the low-income ones. This is affirmed in the Regent Regulation Number 18 of 2013 on Guidelines for Implementation of Sari Tani program which the objective of this program is to increase village fiscal capacity, village poverty reduction through economic empowerment of village people in order to realize village independence and job creation that focus on development of productive economic enterprises.

Differences of this program with similar programs at the national level such as Jaring Pengaman Sosial (JPS), Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) and Beras Miskin (Raskin) as well as at the provincial level such as the Anggur Merah program, that the program has a characteristic, that the poor are involved in efforts to alleviate poverty. They are not merely the object of policy, but also as policy actors. This is realized in the method of implementation of the Sari Tani program which provides the flexibility and full mandate of the community to design a productive activity. From the socio-political aspect, it is a form of restoring political rights and sovereignty to the community to self-manage and manage its own budget but with the provision of government assistance. The form of assistance prepared by the local government on average amounted to Rp 300 million per village in accordance with the type of productive economic enterprises and the number of farmer groups.

A similar study on poverty alleviation is quite a matter of academic attention with its various approaches. Bekun and Tiza (2017: 4-9) in his research found that the implementation of the Sari Tani program in North Central Timor regency has not been optimal, because the target community has not been able to adopt the innovation offered in the form of entrepreneurship transformation, this is because the attitude and behavior of the local community is still bound with customs that are firmly held by the community. Similarly, Dima (2016: 171-176) in his research found that the implementation of the Padat Karya Program (PKP) in North Central Timor regency was constrained by limited resources owned by farmers who have not been able to adopt agricultural innovation, so they are not entitled to rice aid . Next Zulfida, et al. (2015: 307-318) in its study on Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (PNPM) in Bandung regency concluded that in general the implications of the PNPM program had impact on the effects of the economic multiplier of the people and labor mobility, which allocation to economic activities could create the expansion of labor and economic expansion is broadly besides that there is an increase in community capacity. Furthermore, Sangadji, et al. (2015: 495-506) in its study on the implementation of Bantuan Kesejahteraan Siswa Miskin (BKSM), Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah (Jamkesda) and Beras Miskin program in Sidoarjo regency were not targeted and not optimal, but for Rumah Tidak Layak Huni (RTLH) program and revolving funds are effective and targeted. This is because the stage of organizing stakeholders is not all involved in its implementation, as well as monitoring and evaluation more frequently through coordination meetings, without direct monitoring of the target or beneficiary.

While this study examines the performance of agricultural sector policy, especially the Sari Tani program not only from the technical aspects of the procedural but also the political aspects. The assumption is that the success of a policy involving many actors is influenced by the policy content and the context of policy implementation. Therefore, this study uses the Grindle approach (1980) as an auxiliary tool for analyzing the process of the Sari Tani program, while the performance component uses the opinion of Mahmudi (2010). This political aspect is one of the advocates for the success of a policy in the formulation stage until the evaluation phase, because as good as any one program will not succeed without considering the socio-political aspects surrounding the policy.

All this time, agricultural sector policy studies tend to never consider the political aspects in measuring success or anticipation when there is a diversity of responses to the policy. As a result, when problems occur in the field is unresolved and the failure of a policy is usually always delegated to the target community. The problem is ultimately a policy problem because it is unable to solve the problems at each level of policy. For that purpose, this study aims to measure the performance of Sari Tani program using social and political perspective.

Thus, a review of the agricultural sector policy in North Central Timor regency is urgently considered as it contributes to policy studies and practically contributes to local governments in the formulation of development policies in line with the characteristics and capabilities of local communities.

**Methodology Research**

This study explains the agricultural sector policy in North Central Timor regency with a focus on the performance of Sari Tani program conducted with analytical descriptive approach with the aim of building a certain theory or pattern (Creswell, 2010) based on the phenomenon occurs daily (Yin, 1981) especially in the implementation of the Sari Tani program involving many stakeholders. This study focuses on three subdistricts, namely East Miomaffo, North Biboki and North Insana subdistricts with the consideration of the three sub-districts that have the most access to the allocation of the Sari Tani program compared to other subdistricts, as well as these three subdistricts geographically represent the characteristics of the district of North Central Timor, namely mountains, plains and coastal areas. However, as a comparison of the related data in other districts is also shown to see the success rate of the implementation of Sari Tani program in the three subdistricts. Primary data collection was conducted through in-depth interviews with tiered stakeholders directly related to the implementation of Sari Tani program such as; regent, politicians in the regional representative council, elitte bureaucrats, subdistrict, village heads, Unit Pelaksana Sari Tani (UPST), community groups and community groups as target groups, so that purposive sampling is best assessed in determining informants. During the field research process, the researcher also collected secondary data in the form of public documents.

Criteria for measuring the performance of the Sari Sari program include aspects of input, process, output, outcomes, and impacts that have adopted Mahmudi's (2010) opinion. In addition, to complement the analysis in a political perspective, this study uses the concept of Grindle (1980) in explaining the Sari Tani program viewed from two aspects, namely policy content and policy implementation context. The policy content includes; influencing interests, type of benefits, degree of change that you want to achieve, where decisions are made, program implementers and resources are used. As the implementation environment covers; power, interests, and strategies of the involved actors, the characteristics of institutions and regimes that are in power, the level of trust and the response of the implementers.

Research data processing through data reduction stages, drawing conclusions and verification and in order to improve internal validity, the author uses the triangulation method (Moleong, 2001).

**Sari Tani Program Overview**

Government of the North Central Timor regency has a flagship program set up by the regent of Raymundus Sau Fernandes and his deputy Aloysius Kobes since the first period of their leadership, the Sari Tani program as an effort to address poverty problems. The program aims to increase the independence of the community through the development of a variety of superior products by providing resources to increase the independence and income of the community. Its management model is focused on agroecosystem based dry land processing according to geographical characteristics of North Central Timor regency. Specifically, the objectives of the program are contained in the Regulation of Regent Number 18 Year 2013 on Guidelines for the Implementation of the Sari Tani program namely improving the fiscal capacity of the village, the reduction of village poverty through the empowerment of the rural people's economy in order to realize the village independence and the creation of employment-focused business development productive economy.

The implementation of the Sari Tani program begins with the formation of community groups who will receive assistance with the priority for the weakest and most leftist members of the economy but have a strong desire to try to get out of the way. The formation of this farmer group is a strategic step in determining the success of the program, since if the establishment of a farmer group does not comply with the criteria set forth in the regent's regulation, the aid distribution will be misplaced. Furthermore, established farmer groups are given the flexibility to design a productive activity. However, to support the establishment of regional superior products, the type of productive activity is limited to livestock and farming. Types of activities include cows breeding and fattening pigs, while agricultural enterprises engage peanuts, corn and local garlic of single cloves.

Allocation of funds to each group is based on the results of the verification of the activities that are truly productive and capable of increasing the income of the community. The loan assistance provided by the local government is an average of Rp 300 million per village which is adjusted to the number of farmer groups and types of businesses to be managed. This financial aid is the answer to the difficulty faced by the poor, which is easy access to business capital and without any guarantee.

The expected impact of the implementation of the Sari Tani program is to improve the welfare of rural communities through the creation of employment opportunities that focus on the development of productive economic enterprises. Specifically the expected impacts are, reduce the poverty rate of rural communities, increase the opportunities for villagers especially those with low incomes, developing of regional superior products, and strengthening the village's fiscal capacity.

Referring to the objectives of the Sari Tani program, the goal to be achieved from this program is; 1) Increase village community income from Rp. 4,081,912.00 in 2011 to Rp.4, 803,026.00 in 2015. 2) Decrease percentage of poor families in rural areas from 65.62% of families in 2011 to 47.12% of families in 2015. 3) Creation 720 units of new productive enterprises among rural communities in 2015. 4) Establishing 144 units of healthy rural financial institutions in 2015. 5) Realization of 5 types of superior product of districts in 2015. 6) Increasing Village Income Revenue (PADes) Rp. 1,500,000.00 in 2011 to Rp. 7.500.000.00 in 2015.

**Performance Analysis of Sari Tani Program**

The budget allocated for the need for the distribution of Sari Tani funds, which is sourced from Regional Budget Income, is increasing every year. Based on data from the Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa, in the 2012 budget year the funds distributed to 24 villages amounted to Rp. 7.200.000.000,00. In 2013 the budget allocation for the flagship program of the regent increased to Rp.10,800,000,000 which was channeled to 36 villages. Entering the third year (2014) of the budgets for the Sari Tani program was almost tripled, at Rp. 30.300.000.000,00 channeled to 101 villages. Thus, the total fund of Sari Tani has been channeled by Rp. 48.300.000.000,00 with the number of target villages reaching 161 villages, where the average amount of funds each village reaches Rp. 300,000,000.00. The fantastic budget increase in 2014 is inseparable from the political influence, because in 2015 North Central Timor regency held the election of regional heads. It is suspected that this is one of the incumbent strategies to get support from the villagers by disbursing even greater assistance even though the rate of Sari Tani's refund for the first and second year in three sub-districts is relatively low, ie (55.7%) in 2012 and (70.2%) in 2013.

Details of the use of Sari Tani funds distributed to each village amounting to Rp. 300,000,000 does not entirely be channeled to farmer groups, but also used for other operational costs. The other operational cost is Rp. 50,000,000.00 divided into two activity items that is Rp. 40.000.000,00 for operational cost of UPST for 3 years and Rp. 10.000.000,00 is used for UPST training costs, so as to realize the development of district superior programs such as; cows breeding and fattening pigs, while agricultural enterprises engage peanuts, corn and local garlic of single cloves of Rp.250.000.000,00.

From the aspect of human resources, the implementation of the Sari Tani program involves not only the extension of the field from the Department of Agriculture, but also involves actors in a gradual manner. In this program, the regent acts as a responsible and the Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa is the coordinator at the district level where the regional device organization (OPD) involved include the Dinas Pertanian, Dinas Peternakan and Badan Ketahanan Pangan dan Pelaksana Penyuluhan (BKP3) of North Central Timor regency. At the sub-district level, sub-districts act as sub-district coordination teams, however, technically operational and administered by the Head of Economic Section and Development. Thus, all activities of the Sari Tani program in the district are handled by Tim Pelaksana Program Kecamatan (TPPK) consisting of district government officials, coordinator of Petugas Penyuluh Lapangan (PPL) and farmer cadres. The TPPK is directly responsible to the District Implementation Team through the sub-district as responsible for the implementation of Sari Tani program in its territory.

While at the village level structurally the village head functions as chairman of the village level coordination team, but technically operational and administered by the Head of Economic Affairs and Development. While the implementation of the Sari Tani program at the village level is carried out by the UPST and the Pendamping Kelompok Masyarakat (PKM) along with partners who come from local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The UPST officials were selected by village level coordination team through village consultation and determined by village heads through village head decision. PKM personnel are recruited directly by the village community empowerment service as a contractor based on the regent decree. Accordingly, the implementation team at the village level consisted of the UPST, PKM and the partners comprising the extension workers of agricultural fields, supporters and co-operatives from local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The composition of the Sari Tani Management Unit consists of the chairman, the secretary, the treasurer, the verification section and the data section and the publication.

The presence of this flagship program is implemented with an output target of reducing the head of the poor family within five years. The target output was progressively determined gradually, in 2010 the number of poor families was 36,225 head of household (65.62%) and in 2015 the number of poor families dropped to 26,012 head of household (47.12%). The percentage of poor families dropped by 3.7% per annum, resulting in a cumulative decline in poverty rates in North Central Timor regency for five years by 18.53%. Based on data from Central Statistics Agency up to 2017, the poverty rate is 34.10%. This suggests that the impacts of the Sari Tani program have managed to reduce the poverty rate as it has created employment in the agricultural sector. However, government claims that are supported with such data are quite controversial when compared to the realities in the field, which is the high level of arrears experienced by farmer groups.

**Table 1.**

**Total Loans, Returns and Arrears of Sari Tani Funds in East Miomaffo Subdistrict, North Biboki and North Insana Year 2012-2014**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Loans (Rp) | Returns (Rp) | Arrears (Rp) |
| 2012 | 844.435.800 | 374.215.781 | 470.220.019 |
| 2013 | 832.273.000 | 247.624.000 | 584.649.000 |
| 2014 | 3.114.793.200 | 1.007.014.681 | 2.107.778.519 |
| Amount | 4.791.502.000 | 1.628.854.462 | 3.162.647.538 |

Source: processed from primary data, 2017.

Based on table 1, the distribution of Sari Tani funds channeled to Eastern Miomaffo sub district, North Biboki subdistrict and North Insana subdistrict during 2012-2014 is very volatile. Sari Tani fund is revolving and for farmer groups who get it obliged to manage the funds in accordance with the productive effort managed by each farmer group, so that in the following year they are able to refund the funds to the local government. In 2012, the donation was Rp. 844.435.800,00 with the rate of return for the next year of Rp. 374.215.781,00. Thus in the first year the distribution of aid has been arrears by the farmer groups in the three districts of Rp. 470.220.019.00 or reach 55.68%. The high severance of the Sari Tani reimbursement was due to the failure of cow's breeding business. The failure of cow breeding based on the farmer's recognition is due to uncertainty of climate change, resulting in the scarcity of animal feed stocks. As a result, the growth of cows became obstructed and in the following year could not be sold to the market.

In 2013, the distribution of aid to the farmer groups decreased to Rp. 832.273.000,00. This is due to the decrease in the number of farmer groups and the type of productive enterprises that require smaller capital such as local garlic single cloves and pig fattening efforts. However, the data obtained shows that the rolling refund rate is only Rp. 247.624.000,00. Based on informants' recognition, the problem was due to the failure of farmer groups in managing their productive business. Consequently, on this stage of disbursement there is a arrears of Rp. 584.649.000,00 or reach 70.2%. This shows that the percentage of arrears in the second year is greater than that in the first year.

Furthermore, in 2014, the distribution of aid to farmer groups increased dramatically compared to 2013, which was Rp. 3.114.793.200,00. The increase was due to the increasing number of businesses and the number of farmer groups that was targeted by the regent's flagship program. However, like two years earlier, the revolving refund rate only reached Rp. 1,007,014,681.00, whereas the arrears of target farming groups if the accumulation reached Rp. 2.107.778.519.00 or 67.7%.

Overall, the Sari Tani fund that was rolled over to the target group reached Rp. 4,791,502,000 with a refund rate of Rp. 1.628.854.462,00 or only 34%, while revolving fund in arrears at farmer group level is Rp. 3.162.647.538,00 or 66%.

Based on data recapitulation from the North Central Timor Empowerment Service, up to 2017, the budget allocation for the Sari Tani program reached Rp. 33,979,367,111.00 channeled to 161 villages located in North Central Timor regency with interest of Rp. 2,091.058.165,00, then the obligation to be returned by all farmer group is Rp. 36.111.518.676,00.

However, until February 2017, the rate of return on principal and interest at farmer level was very low at Rp. 13.678.956.150,00 or 38%. Whereas the arrears to be returned by farmer groups at the regency level reached Rp. 22,395,314,762.00 or 62%, but this figure is still smaller than the percentage of delinquency in three districts of 64%, district-level data is presented in table 2.

**Table 2.**

**Number of Loan, Return and Arrears of Sari Tani Fund per Type of Business in North Central Timor Regency in 2017**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Type of Business | Loan (Rp) | Return (Rp) | Arrears (Rp) |
| Cow breeding | 27.843.475.265 | 11.851.089.246 (42.6%) | 15.992.915.630 (57.4%) |
| Fattening pigs | 7.718.753.340 | 1.525.451.185 (21%) | 6.155.524.780 (79%) |
| Peanuts | 97.316.000 | 79.728.250 (82%) | 17.587.750 (18%) |
| Corns | 316.188.071 | 166.034.719 (52.5%) | 150.153.352 (47.5%) |
| Local Garlic | 135.786.000 | 56.652.750 (42%) | 79.133.250 (58%) |
| Amount | 36.111.518.676 | 13.678.956.150 (38%) | 22.395.314.762 (62%) |

Source: processed from primary data, 2017.

If we look at the disparities between the aid that has been channeled with the returns in large enough farmer groups, it is necessary to review the local government's claim that the Sari Tani program has had an impact on the rate of poverty reduction in rural areas. From field search, especially at the farmer group level, the average level of those managing Sari Tani funds had difficulty returning the principal loan along with the interest. There are variations of the reasons why they are having difficulty refunding the revolving fund. For farmer groups working on cows breeding and fattening pigs, the first reason was the death of their livestock due to a disease, which the farmers were unable to cope with due to lack of knowledge for it. Related to the case of cows and pigs was not merely a farmer's fault. Based on the recognition of farmers as well as the UPST, the obstacles faced by farmers are less intensive as well as field counselors, both agricultural extension workers from both the Dinas Pertanian and Dinas Peternakan and community recruits specifically recruited to assist farmers. But specially for PKM recruited by Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa only provides assistance in the areas of financial management and reporting.

The second reason, some farmer groups working on cow breeding and pigs fattening were unwilling to return assistance on the grounds that some of the funds they received were borrowed by a village device and promised to be returned. But in reality the village's devices are unwilling to return the money, because using the power approach then the people are unable to deal with the devices of the village, so as a form of resistance the farmers are unwilling to return some of the funds they have received.

The third case of why farmers are unable to return Sari Tani's funds and interest in the next year is more due to poor farmer-level behavior and ineffective controls by field facilitators. The farmer's wrongdoing that cow breeding and pig fattening buy cattle and pigs with under-price, as a result the Dinas Peternakan they earn can not be sold within a year. For example, the price of a quality cow's can be sold within a year for Rp. 4.000.000,00, so the next year the cows could be sold at an average price of Rp. 10,000,000.00, so in one year they profit about Rp. 6.000.000,00. Included in this case is the actions of some farmers who lack the sense of responsibility in managing the aid are they use the cows and pigs for consumption needs, especially for the interests of the indigenous or party, and when the field companion inquired about the existence of their cow or pig they just replied that their livestock have died from disease.

Attitudes and behaviors shown by farmers based on the evidence and recognition of farmers working on cow breeding and pig fattening are in line with secondary data obtained from Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa where they are having difficulty in revocating the revolving fund. Recorded until February 2017, the realization of the rate of return of the beef cattle business with its interest rate is only Rp. 11,851,089,246.00 or 42.56%, while the principal arrears with interest reached Rp. 15,992,915,630.00 or reached 57.44%. The more apprehensive is the farmer's level of pigs fattening business whose return rate is only 19.76% or Rp. 1,525,451,185.00 and the arrears up to February 2017 of Rp. 6,155,524,780.00 or 79.24%.

Although most of the farmers have difficulty in the reimbursement of Sari Tani fund, there are farmer groups who managed to bring it back in time. Based on the data of the community group “Citra Membangunan” with peanut business able to manage the funds well, from Rp. 26,500,000.00 received, as of December 2016 they successfully paid off.

The interesting findings of the field were that some of the people who had succeeded in returning the Sari Tani assistance did not come from the productive effort of the Sari Tani program, but came from a business outside this flagship program. Such cases in monitoring and evaluation by Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa are considered not as a failure of the program. Local governments only use the measure of success in terms of rate of return of assistance and never take into account the origin of the money used to return the aid. If the government continues to be permissive in such cases, it will be biased in determining the success of a program.

In addition to the arrears of returns on funds, the aspect of the Sari Tani program implementation process also has many problems, such as; 1) There is a duplicate of the same name in farming groups who have received assistance from other programs at the provincial level. This case was caused by the error at the village level in identifying the people who were eligible for assistance from the Sari Tani program. This demonstrates the degree of coordination both vertically and horizontally among related institutions is less synergistic. 2) There is internal conflict at the village level between the village head and the manager of UPST in the village of Haekto due to a misunderstanding regarding the disbursement of aid distribution to the farmer group and the operational costs of the UPST which the village head is not willing to sign the receipt. It also suggests that each respective actor at the village level has not yet fully understood the tasks and functions it has been responsibility. 3) There is a misunderstanding between a community group companion and a district government in Noemuti Timur. This suggests that community-based partners have not mastered the reporting procedures in a gradual manner, in accordance with their technical guidelines, they are obliged to coordinate with the subdistrict government as the extension of the hand of the regent as the responsibility of the Tani sari program. In addition, the behaviors shown by community groups are less concerned with the role of Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa as a programmer at the kabupaten level. Based on the acknowledgment of several district heads, the lack of coordination at the level of the community group, the UPST, the village head to the subdistrict, is independent of the implementation of village autonomy under the Law Number 6 of 2016 concerning the Village, which reduces the role of subdistricts in the implementation of development at the village level after the adoption of the law, so some village heads feel that there is no need to coordinate with the subdistrict but directly to the regent. 4) Supporters of community groups have difficulties in collecting farming groups that have been due. Based on the acknowledgment of one of the staff of the Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa, the solution was to replace the community group from the local village’s aktor, so it was hoped that the Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa would be able to raise the Sari Tani fund loan to the farmer group.

**Implementation of Sari Tani Program: Political Perspective**

Implementation of the Sari Tani program in the North Central Timor regency involves cross-institutional and many actors in stages, ranging from district level to village level. The number of actors involved allowed the emergence of interventions in the same way. At the regency level, at the beginning of the program implementation involves elite rulers and elite bureaucrats, at which point the political atmosphere always surrounds the decision-making process. In a political perspective, bureaucrats elites involved in the implementation of this program are generally not separated from such motives; power, income, prestige, security, convenience, loyalty, pride in the work results and the desire to serve the public interest (Festianto, 2014). The actors referred to in this are scattered in the relevant regional device organizations to the village government.

The diversity of the actors' interests affects the dynamics of the implementation of this program in the field. In this context one of the forms of interaction between the decision maker and the implementer is seen in the early stages of the activity, namely the recruitment phase of the PKM conducted by Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa. At this stage it is politicized politically and elite bureaucratic elites, the mode they make by recommending their people who apply for a group of people, so the recruitment process tends to be just a form of mere formalities, as previously determined by the prospective community assistants who will graduate. People who are given recommendations by the elite are those who have the same political affiliation or still have family relationships. Working with a systematic political network by formalizing the recruitment process of the community group is ultimately in the process of less optimal accompaniment. This is due to the relatively low capacity of field co-operators because it does not correspond to the scientific field specification required in providing assistance to farmer groups. In addition, the proximity factor to the elite of rulers and policyholders is made as a shield by the community group when evaluating their performance by district or village heads. Based on the village head's recognition, the community support group is less intense in assisting the village. This phenomenon suggests that related oegional device organization in the monitoring and evaluation process tend to be weak and helpless in the face of strong intervention of political interests, both political and elite bureaucracy. As a result, cross-institutional control functions in stages are not running optimally because they are in conflict with the interests of the authorities.

In addition, externally cross-institutional coordination also shows the tendency of the emergence of the ego sector of the sector resulting in conflict in the field. Weak coordination in assistance to farmer groups carried out by agricultural extension and co-supervisor from Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa, Dinas Pertanian, Dinas Peternakan, BKP3 and the non-governmental community partners cause frictions between them in the field. They claim to each other about the limits of their respective authorities such as those in Oeolo Village and the emergence of social jealousy due to disparity in employment status. The companion of the community group who is a member of the regional contract in the process of distributing the honor is always late to three months, this is one of the less intensive facilitation in the field.

Weak cross-institutional coordination is also seen in the verification of the feasibility of purchase of cows by target groups. Purchase of cattle breeds for the business of nomination of the standard according to the standard of Dinas Peternakan at Rp. 4.000.000,00 per head. However, in fact, some farmer groups bought beef cattle for Rp. 2.000.000,00 per head. In fact, if the purchase of cattle breeding done according to the standard in the first year can already be sold with a price range of Rp. 10.000.000,00 per head, so with such calculations ideally farmers do not have difficulty in restoring the Sari Tani fund, but the reality is not so. Facing such cases the relevant agencies have not been able to sanction the farming groups who commit these deviations, as indeed in technical guidelines have not been regulated on the mechanisms and forms of the sanctions. This shows less synergistic cross-actors, so weak in identifying the feasibility of purchasing cow's breeding.

The model of Sari Tani aid management mechanism applied when viewed from a cultural social perspective has indirectly changed the values of collectivity in rural communities. Social cohesiveness that has become a characteristic of rural communities has been weakening and shifting with the strengthening of individualities values. The distribution of Sari Tani funds is based on the type of business of a farmer group that usually consists of ten members, at the stage of management conducted by each member individually. As a result, when the livestock belonging to one of the dead members it is the responsibility of the member of the farmer concerned and the other farmer members do not feel responsible for the problem. This management model has contributed to creating individualism, since its management is not collective.

The background of this program can not be separated from political promises during the campaign, so there is a tendency for the regime to always claim that the implementation of the Sari Tani program has succeeded in alleviating poverty in the countryside and has hit the centers of productive economic activities in the targeted villages. Claims for successful poverty alleviation programs are also supported by data released by the Central Bureau of Statistics of North Central Timor showing a tendency to reduce poverty in North Central Timor regency.

However, if further traced, the claims of successful implementation of the program were inversely proportional to the findings in the field showing the amount of the arrears of Sari Tani funds at the target group level until February 2017 showed a high enough figure of 62%. In addition, the revolving source of return is partly not from the type of business that receives assistance from the Sari Tani program, but is derived from productive efforts outside the program, as the average community has other farming business. The phenomenon is one of the influential influences on the sustainability and performance of this regent's flagship program. Thus, the success and ability of the policy are determined by the timely allocation of resources, the integration of the hierarchy between the implementing agencies of the commitment and leadership capabilities of the implementing office (Keban, 2008).

**Conclusions**

The intervention of political interest in the implementation of the Sari Tani program was conducted in a gradual manner, at the district level the intervention occurred at the stage of recruitment of community asistant group conducted by Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa where some of the community's associates had proximity to elite rulers or elite bureaucrats, closeness based on political affiliation and the closeness of family ties. This has led to the control and monitoring function performed by the institution in the tier to the performance of the PKM not running optimally. While interventions at the village level occur at the community identification stage which is worthy of the support of Sari Tani, in which case both the village head and the implementing agency of Sari Tani in making the data on the community tend to seduce their family or who have the same political affiliation with the village elite and the elite authority. This caused some of the distribution of Sari Tani's assistance to the farmer group in the wrong target. While internally the Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa as program coordinator has not been able to apply control instruments and sanction mechanisms related to the performance of the field assistant and to the farmer groups who have not yet paid the aid of Sari Tani. In the end, the magnitude of the intervention of the political economy interests of the actors involved in the implementation of this program has an impact on the performance of the Sari Tani program that has not been optomal, which is marked by the low rate of Sari Tani refund of Rp. 13,678,956,150.00 or 38% of the total funds disbursed amounted to Rp. 36,111,518,676.00.

**Recommendations**

Based on these conclusions, so that the objectives and targets of the Sari Tani program can be achieved and to improve cross-sectoral coordination, the local government needs to establish a special team. This team will play a role as coordinator in accelerating the development of agriculture sector which is directly responsible to the regent and is independent, because based on the analysis, the root of the problem has not been optimally the performance of Sari Tani program due to the large intervention of political economy interest and weakness of gradual control function.

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